Legal Opinions and Precedent Involving Chicago Tenants Rights

The ordinance is construed liberally to protect public health, safety, and welfare and establish landlord and tenant rights. Its stated purpose guides statutory interpretation. Friedman v. Krupp, 282 Ill. App. 3d 436, 443, 668 N.E.2d 142, 147 (1st Dist.).

The RLTO protects security deposits and addresses the unequal bargaining positions of landlords and tenants, including protection against landlord overreaching. Steenes v. MAC Property Management, 2014 IL App (1st) 120719; Pitts v. Holt, 304 Ill. App. 3d 871, 710 N.E.2d 155 (1st Dist. 1999), citing Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 267 (1st Dist. 1996).

The six-unit limit concerns total dwelling units, not just rented or occupied units. A seven-unit building does not qualify merely because six or fewer units are occupied; the owner-occupancy requirement must also be met. Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 3d 351, 632 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1993).

Structures separated by a firewall may be treated as separate buildings. A tenant’s townhouse can remain covered even when the landlord lives two doors away in the same row, because each townhouse is a separate building. Allen v. Lin, 356 Ill. App. 3d 405, 412, 826 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1st Dist. 2005).

Returning the deposit does not excuse earlier commingling of tenant funds. The cited decision rejects a de minimis or “no harm” defense to that violation. Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 272, 666 N.E.2d 670, 676–77 (1st Dist. 1996).

A landlord holds a security deposit in trust, rather than as personal funds. Misuse can create a fiduciary debt that is not dischargeable in bankruptcy; trust funds are distinguished from the landlord’s bankruptcy estate. In re McGee, 353 F.3d 537, 540–41 (7th Cir. 2003); Starr v. Gay, 354 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 822 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1st Dist. 2004).

A real estate closing credit for the amount of the tenant’s deposit can transfer the deposit without commingling or exposing it to the landlord’s creditors. The defense requires an actual closing with a documented deposit credit. Starr v. Gay, 354 Ill. App. 3d 610, 615–16, 822 N.E.2d 89, 93–94 (1st Dist. 2004).

The deposit-return period begins when the tenant actually surrenders possession; Meyer discusses the 45-day return window. Keeping keys alone does not establish a willful holdover—continued control of the premises and intent to remain matter. Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 3d 351, 361 (1st Dist. 1993); Hoffman v. Altamore, 352 Ill. App. 3d 246, 250 (2004), citing Hoopes v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 48 Ill. App. 3d 146 (1977).

Ordinary wear is depreciation from normal daily living and usual use of the home, not damage caused by misuse or failure to perform customary tenant responsibilities. Boyer v. Buol, No. 1-13-2780 (1st Dist. 2014).

The provision allows deductions for unpaid rent not lawfully withheld and reasonable repairs of tenant-caused damage. Without an agreement between the parties, a landlord may not unilaterally deduct postage from the deposit. Boyer v. Buol, No. 1-13-2780 (1st Dist. 2014); Nadhir v. Salomon, 2011 IL App (1st) 110851.

Repair documentation must show that payment was actually received. A photocopy of an unnegotiated check does not establish payment: it can be produced without delivering the check to anyone. Boyer v. Buol, No. 1-13-2780 (1st Dist. 2014).

Lawrence held that the provision did not require proof of knowing or willful conduct to recover the specified damages for failure to pay deposit interest. Current ordinance exceptions and cure provisions must still be reviewed for a present-day claim. Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 1, 9–10, 754 N.E.2d 334, 339 (2001).

The actual deposit is separate from statutory damages. Returning some or all of it does not itself reduce the statutory award for a qualifying violation; the cited case addresses a failure to provide a proper deposit receipt. Solomon v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d 132, 136–37, 612 N.E.2d 3 (1st Dist. 1993).

Namur treats these damages as a statutory penalty subject to the two-year limitation in 735 ILCS 5/13-202. A commingling claim accrues when the landlord deposits the funds. Other claims can have different deadlines, so obtain advice promptly. Namur v. The Habitat Company, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1013, 691 N.E.2d 782, 786 (1st Dist. 1998).

The cited decision explains that this disclosure provision contains no materiality qualification or de minimis exception. Required violation disclosures cannot be omitted simply because a landlord considers their effect on habitability minor. Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 271, 666 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1st Dist. 1996).

Residential leases carry an implied warranty of habitability. Substantial defects that make a home unsafe or unsanitary may support an affirmative claim or a defense to a nonpayment eviction; substantial code compliance is relevant. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 Ill. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985).

A residential lease includes a covenant of quiet enjoyment. Landlord interference can include unauthorized entry, harassment, or demands that a tenant leave, depending on the lease and circumstances. Chapman v. Brokaw, 225 Ill. App. 3d 662, 588 N.E.2d 462 (3d Dist. 1992).

The landlord must receive written notice of the intended deduction and have the full 14-day opportunity to make the requested repairs before the tenant deducts rent under this provision. A deduction occurs when the landlord receives the partial payment, not when the tenant sends it. American National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038–40, 691 N.E.2d 1162, 1165–66 (1st Dist. 1997).

Sternic applies the five-year limitation in 735 ILCS 5/13-205 to claims under this provision. These damages are not statutory penalties because the provision does not prescribe a fixed amount or formula independent of actual harm. Sternic v. Hunter Properties, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 915, 918–19, 801 N.E.2d 974, 976 (1st Dist. 2003).

A clause requiring payment of a landlord’s attorney fees only to the extent permitted by courts, statutes, or ordinances was compatible with the RLTO. That limitation matters; the decision does not approve every landlord fee clause. Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 267, 666 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1st Dist. 1996).

The ordinance prohibits lease provisions limiting landlord liability. Even a conditional clause phrased as applying only to the extent permitted by law does not save a prohibited liability limitation. Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 268, 666 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1st Dist. 1996).

A lease cannot require a tenant to waive written termination notices or their manner of service. A general statement that the clause is subject to the RLTO does not cure that prohibited waiver. Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 269, 666 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1st Dist. 1996).

A tenant’s motive for invoking the summary-related termination remedy does not determine its validity. Plambeck rejects adding a “clean hands” requirement that the provision does not contain; compliance with the applicable termination requirements still matters. Plambeck v. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266–67, 666 N.E.2d 670, 673–74 (1st Dist. 1996).

A court may take judicial notice of the City of Chicago’s published RLTO summary current at lease signing. Failure to provide the most current, complete required summary can support lease termination under this provision. Kopnick v. JL Woode Company, LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 152054 (March 30, 2017).