Violations, Termination, Maintenance Disputes

Violations, Termination, Maintenance Disputes: Chicago, Illinois in regards to Chicago Tenants Rights Cases under the RLTO

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Chicago RLTO §5-12-010, Title, Purpose, and Scope – Chicago Tenants Rights Cases

Liberal Construction of Chicago RLTO 

As the purpose of the Chicago RLTO is to protect and promote the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and to establish the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, it shall be liberally construed. Friedman vs. Krupp, 282 Ill. App. 3d 436, 443; 668 N.E.2d 142, 147 (1st Dist. 2005) (stated purpose of RLTO is primary guide in statutory construction).

Purpose of the Chicago RLTO

The Chicago RLTO was enacted in part to “help protect the rights of tenants with respect to their security deposits.” Steenes vs. Mac Property, 16 N.E.3d 243, 2014 IL App (1st) 120719, (1st Dist, 2014). The RLTO was also “passed with a recognition of the historical disparity of bargaining positions between landlord and tenants and to protect tenants from overreaching by
residential landlords.” Pitts vs. Holt, 710 N.E.2d 155, 304 Ill.App.3d 871 (1st Dist. 1999) (emphasis added) citing Plambeck vs. Greystone Management, 281 Ill.App.3d at 267, 666 N.E.2d 670 (1st Dist, 1996).

Continue reading for more Case Law and Renters Rights Information under the Chicago Landlord Tenant Ordinance also known as the RLTO.

Six Dwelling Unit Limit of Chicago RLTO 5-12-020(a) Is Determined by Total Number of Dwelling Units Not Rented Units

To fall within the exemption of this section, a building must have six or fewer total dwelling units. If a building has seven units, but only six or fewer are occupied at the time of rental, the RLTO still applies. A “dwelling unit” is defined in § 05-12-030(a). Meyer vs. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 2d 351, 632 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1993).

“building” “means a structure, or part thereof, enclosing any occupancy including residential . . . [w]hen separated by a firewall, each unit so separated shall be deemed a building.” Allen vs. Lin, 356 Ill.App.3d 405, 412; 826 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1st Dist. 2005) (citing to Chic. Muni Code, 13-4-010). Thus, a tenant in townhouse, located on a row of Page 2 of 6 townhouses, only two doors removed from the landlord’s townhouse, is still covered by the RLTO since each townhouse is a separate building

There Is No “De Minimus” or “No Harm” Exception to RLTO Section 5-12-080

All relevant authority rejects excuses for commingling and the “no harm” argument where the security deposit is returned. Plambeck vs. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 272; 666 N.E2d 670, 676-7 (1st Dist. 1996).

Security Deposits are Held “In Trust” by the Landlord under Section 5-12-080(a) and Are Not Part of the Bankruptcy Estate of the Landlord

A landlord holds the tenant’s security deposit “in trust” pursuant to the standards under RLTO 5-12-080(a), and thus the landlord is a fiduciary of that trust. Thus, if a landlord spends the money they have committed an act of “defalcation” and the debt (i.e. the security deposit and any damages) is not dischargeable in bankruptcy (see 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(4)). In Re McGee, 353 F.3d 537, 540-41 (7th Cir. 2003); see also, Starr vs. Gay, 354 Ill.App.3d 610, 613; 822 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1st Dist. 2004), holding that Section 5-12-080(a) is “designed to keep tenant monies out of the reach of creditors . . . [and to prevent] a landlord’s intentional or inadvertent personal use of tenant funds.”

The ‘Credit Method’ of Transferring Security Deposits at Closing Does Not Violate RLTO 5-12-080(a) Because It Does Not Commingle or Put At Risk the Security Deposit

The ‘credit method,’ which is a transferring of a security deposit as a credit given at the close of sale of a building, between the current owner and a third-party purchaser does not result in the commingling of the tenant’s security deposit with the landlord’s assets since it does not render the deposit attachable to landlord property  or otherwise violate the trust that a tenant’s security deposit is held in by a landlord.  Starr vs. Gay, 354 Ill.App.3d 610, 615; 822 N.E.2d 89, 93-94 (1st Dist. 2004). However, there must be a real estate closing that includes a credit in the amount of the tenant’s security deposit to fall under this defense. Id. at 615-16, 822 N.E.2d at Page 3 of 94.

When is a Unit “Vacated” Under RLTO 5-12-080(d)

A tenant vacates when he or she actually surrenders possession of the leasehold, and the 45 day window for return of the security deposit accrues at that time. Meyer vs. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 2d 351, 361; 632 N.E.2d 22, 28 (1st Dist. 1993).

The retention of keys is not dispositive in determining whether a tenant willfully held over after the expiration of a tenancy in Chicago. Instead, the Court should evaluate whether “after the expiration of the lease term, the tenant exercised dominion over the premises indicative of an intent to continue the tenancy.” Hoffman vs. Altamore, 352 Ill. App. 3d 246, 250; 815 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) citing Hoopes vs. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 48 Ill. App. 3d 146 (1977).

Reasonable Wear and Tear Defined Under Chicago RLTO 5-12-080(d)

“[Ordinary wear and tear] has been defined as the wear which property undergoes when the tenant does nothing more than to come and [go] and perform the acts usually incident to an ordinary way of life.” Stated otherwise reasonable wear and tear is the depreciation which occurs when the tenant does nothing inconsistent with the usual use and omits no acts which it is usual for a tenant to perform.  Boyer vs. Buol, No. 1-13-2780 (1st. Dist. 2014).

Landlord’s Deduction for Postage is Improper Under RLTO 5-12-080(d)

Deductions from security deposits are covered in RLTO Section 5-12-080(d) which provides, d) The landlord shall, within 45 days after the date that the tenant vacates the dwelling unit, return to the tenant the security deposit or any balance thereof and the required interest thereon; provided, however, that the landlord, or successor landlord, may deduct from such security deposit or interest due thereon for the following: (1) Any unpaid rent which has not been validly withheld or deducted pursuant to state or federal law or local ordinance; and (2) A reasonable amount necessary to repair any damage caused to the premises by the tenant. These two (2) enumerated deductions listed above are the only deductions that a landlord is allowed to take from a tenant’s security deposit. “Under the plain language of the Ordinance, as well as the reasoning in Nadhir, it seems clear that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, a landlord may not unilaterally deduct postage from a tenant’s security deposit.” Boyer vs. Buol, No. 1-13-2780 (1st. Dist. 2014); See also Nadhir vs. Salomon, 2011 IL App. 110851 (1st Dist. 2011).

Photocopies of Checks are Not “Paid Receipts”Under RLTO 5-12-080(d)

“We note initially that the Ordinance does not define the term nor do the parties cite any law as to its meaning. However, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a receipt as “[a] written acknowledgment that something has been received.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); see also Page 4 of also Merriam-Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed. 1969) (defining a writing acknowledging the receiving of goods or money). Thus, in order to qualify as a receipt, the documentation provided by defendants would have to show that the $220 in question was actually received by Bolek & Lolek. This requirement is not satisfied by a photocopy of a check that has not been negotiated by its payee. As plaintiff points out in her brief, a photocopy of an un-negotiated check can easily be produced without the check being given to anyone, just like a picture of cash.” Boyer vs. Buol, No. 1-13-2780 (1st. Dist. 2014).

No Requirement of “Willful” or “Knowing” For Violation of RLTO 5-12-080(f)

“Nothing in RLTO Section 5-12-080(f) requires proof that the landlord’a actions were knowing or willful. A landlord’a duty to comply with the statute is absolute.  If a landlord requires a security deposit, the landlord is required to pay the tenant interest on that deposit. If he fails to do so, he is liable to the tena nt for the damages specified in the ordinance. There are no exceptions. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, as this one is, the court should not look to extrinsic aids for construction. The statute must be enforced as written, and a court may not depart from its plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature.” Lawrence vs. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10; 754 N.E.2d 334, 339 (2001).

Damage Awards Under RLTO 5-12-080(f) are Not Abated For Portions of Security Deposit Actually Returned

The actual security deposit is not included in the statutory damages available under RLTO 5-12-080(f). The RLTO provides for the return of the deposit and statutory damages when the landlord fails to issue a proper receipt to a tenant or prospective tenant. Solomon vs. American National Bank and Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 132, 136-137; 612 N.E.2d 3, 10 (1st Dist. 1993).

RLTO 5-12-080(f) Imposes “Statutory Penalties” and Are Subject to Two-Year Statue of Limitations

Under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, “actions for damages for a statutory penalty” have a two-year statute of limitations, 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1996). Section 5-12- 080(f) imposes a “statutory penalty,” and is therefore subject to that two-year statute of limitations. Namur vs. The Habitat Company, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1013; 691 N.E.2d 782, 786 (1st Dist. 1998). Where Plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon commingling of assets, it accrues when the landlord deposits the security deposit. Id.

Continue learning more about Chicago RLTO Case Law and Chicago Renters Rights Information under the Chicago Landlord Tenant Ordinance.

No “De Minimus” or “Materiality” Exception to RLTO 5-12-100(a)

Unlike other sections of the Chicago RLTO, which expressly include materiality language, this RLTO 5-12-100(a) contains no qualifying language and is aimed at disclosure of all violations without regard for the degree to which they affect habitability. There is no de minimus exception. Plambeck vs. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 271; 666 N.E2d 670, 676 (1st Dist. 1996).

Warranty of Habitability Is Implied Under the Chicago RLTO

warranty of habitability is implied in every residential lease. Jack Spring vs. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (warranty exists and is fulfilled by substantial compliance with Chicago building code); Glasoe vs. Trinkle, 107 Ill.2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985) (implied regardless of whether there is local building code; “the defect must be of such a substantial nature as to render the premises unsafe or unsanitary, and thus unfit for occupancy”). Tenants may enforce this warranty in affirmative individual or class action lawsuits, or in defense to eviction actions based on their non-payment of rent.

Quiet Enjoyment Is Implied Under the Chicago RLTO

The covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied in every residential lease. This means that the landlord may not interfere with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment, for example, by entering the premises without the tenant’s permission or as provided in the parties’ lease, or by demanding that the tenant leave, or by harassing the tenant. Chapman vs. Brokaw, 225 Ill. App. 3d 662, 588 N.E.2d 462 (3rd Dist. 1992).

When Can a Tenant Withhold or Deduct Rent Under RLTO 5-12-110(d)

A tenant withholds or deducts rent under the Chicago RLTO when the landlord receives partial payment, not when the tenant mails, posts, or sends partial payment. But, a tenant cannot deduct rent under the Chicago RLTO until the landlord has received written notice of the tenant’s intent to deduct rent, and has had a full 14 day opportunity to cure by making the requested repairs. American National Bank vs. Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038-40; 691 N.E.2d 1162, 1165-6 (1st Dist. 1997).

The Statute of Limitations for RLTO 5-12-110(e)

The Statute of Limitations for an action under RLTO Section 5-12-110(e) is 5 years, as allowed by 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (recovery of personal property or damages for the conversion thereof), as these damages are not statutory penalties because they do not specify an amount to be awarded for any violations or impose a formula for calculating an award without regard to the actual damages. Sternic vs. Hunter Properties, Inc., 344 Ill.App.3d 915, 918-19; 801 N.E.2d 974, 976 (1st Dist. 2003).

An Attorneys’ Fees Clause is Permissible To The Extent It Does Not Conflict With the RLTO

A fees clause that provides for a tenant to pay landlord’s attorneys’ fees “to the extent permissible by courts, statutes, or ordinances” is compatible with Chicago RLTO 5-12-140. Plambeck vs. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 267; 666 N.E2d 670, 674 (1st Dist. 1996).

No Liability Limitation Clauses Allowed Under the Chicago RLTO

The Chicago RLTO prohibits “the limitation of any liability.” The command to delete any and all exculpatory clauses is complete and unambiguous, and it does not allow for any qualification.  A lease may not even contain a conditional liability limitation clause containing language analogous to, “to the extent permissible by courts, statutes, or ordinances.” Plambeck vs. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 268; 666 N.E2d 670, 674 (1st Dist. 1996).

No Waiver of Notice Allowed Under the RLTO

The Chicago RLTO prohibits lease clauses requiring tenants agreement “to waive any written termination of tenancy notice or manner of service.”  The command to delete waiver of notice clauses is clear and absolute. Such clauses will not be saved for language analogous to “subject to the provision of the Chicago Landlord and Tenant Ordinance.” Plambeck vs.
Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 269; 666 N.E2d 670, 675 (1st Dist. 1996)

Tenant’s Motive For Breaking Lease is Irrelevant Under 5-12-170

A tenant’s motive for invoking the right of early lease termination provided under RLTO 5-12-170 is simply not relevant to the determination whether the termination is valid. There is no “clean hands” doctrine overlaid on the text of this section, and imposing one would counter-act the inherent purpose of the Chicago RLTO to correct the historical disparity between bargaining powers of landlord and tenant. Plambeck vs. Greystone Management, 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266-7; 666 N.E2d 670, 673-4 (1st Dist. 1996).

The Court May Take “Judicial Notice” of the RLTO Summary on the City of Chicago Web Site

The reviewing Court may take judicial notice of the RLTO Summary on the City of Chicago Web Site at the time of lease signing as the most current RLTO Summary provided for by the City of Chicago. A Landlord’s failure to provide the most current and complete Summary is legal grounds for lease termination under Chicago RLTO Section 5-12-170. Kopnick vs. JL Woode Company, Hawthorne House et al., 2017 IL. App. (1st) 152054 (1st. Dist. March 30, 2017).

***If you have any questions regarding Chicago Tenants Rights Cases under the Chicago Landlord Tenant Ordinance please contact Aaron Krolik Law Office directly. We do not recommend you practice Chicago & Cook County Illinois Landlord & Tenant Law without a law license.

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